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In recent years African countries have faced a barrage of policy advice backed with 
financial support from development partners urging them to implement ‘good 
governance’ reforms. Good governance has come to mean support for improving the 
enforcement of property rights, the rule of law, fighting corruption and improving 
accountability. These reforms have enjoyed broad support because many of these 
goals are desirable in themselves, and in addition, an underlying set of institutional 
theories suggest that these reforms will make markets more efficient by reducing the 
transaction costs of enforcing contracts and providing efficient public goods. The 
reforms have faced two sorts of problems in Africa and elsewhere. First, in conditions 
of significant underdevelopment, the implementation of these reforms has been rather 
limited. This is because the enforcement of formal rights and institutions presupposes 
economic and political conditions that are associated with advanced economies. The 
economic assumption is that tax revenues are available for the enforcement of a 
general structure of rights, which is an expensive proposition. An even more 
important political assumption is that the rights that are to be enforced are sufficiently 
aligned with the interests of dominant economic and political organizations for their 
effective enforcement to be feasible. In reality neither of these assumptions holds in 
the typical developing country and so very limited improvements in governance 
defined in this have proved feasible. It is therefore not very surprising that good 
governance reforms have had a very limited effect on growth and development in 
countries following these policies.  
 
Related to these observations is a more significant criticism: ‘good governance’ as a 
policy priority is based on an ahistorical reading of the factors that have driven the 
transition of largely pre-capitalist economies with low productivity into economies 
with significant ‘modern’ sectors with higher levels of productivity. Historically, 
these transformations have involved a very important role for politics and the state, 
not in enforcing some pre-existing structure of rights, but rather in changing property 
rights structures and creating opportunities for the creation of new productive 
enterprises while managing political stability in contexts where the potential for 
conflict is very high. Markets, defined as institutions supporting voluntary individual 
contracting, have always been important for economic activity but have rarely played 
a dominant role in driving these transformations (Wood 2002; Khan 2004, 2005).  
 
Defining the critical governance capabilities for developing countries in terms of 
‘good governance’ ignores the important transformative governance capabilities that 
successful developmental states must have. Indeed, the most damaging aspect of the 
good governance agenda is that it has focused policy attention on a series of reforms 
that can at best be marginally implemented, and therefore have a marginal effect on 
the efficiency of markets. The problem is that for developing countries, a small 
improvement in the efficiency of markets will not address the more fundamental 
problem that they have very limited productive capabilities to benefit from enhanced 
market access. What they lack are economic organizations that are productive enough 
2 
 
to be competitive in a global economy. Growth has recently accelerated in a number 
of African countries over the last decade, driven by minerals and a few productive 
sectors, primarily in agro-industries. But for broad-based development to be truly 
sustainable, social, political and institutional processes have to support the continuous 
development of new productive capabilities and organizations across the economy. 
This requires strong governance capabilities but these are not the governance 
capabilities that the good governance agenda focuses on. 
 
Social transformations that result in the transformation of traditional economies and 
modes of organization into modern productive ones are clearly likely to be periods of 
relatively high levels of conflict and vulnerability. These changes inevitably create 
winners and losers. As a result, they are not only contested, but in many cases the 
push and pull of politics can hold back the emergence of viable and successful 
organizations, or create opportunities for unproductive resource grabbing. There are 
no blueprints that are always successful because initial conditions and inherited 
property rights structures are different across countries and the political settlements 
that constrain what can be enforced are also different. Nevertheless, a national policy 
discourse is vital because rapid transformations do not just happen, they have to be 
organized and the changes have to have sufficient support for reasonable levels of 
enforcement. Often what tends to happen is that the reality of the transformation that 
is actually happening is not understood or analysed even by the elites who are 
ostensibly leading it. The result is that progress is often unnecessarily slow, the 
institutional and policy changes are often not the best possible ones, and success is 
often serendipitous rather than planned. In many cases retrogression can happen with 
productivity-enhancing transformations being blocked or reversed because opposition 
was not foreseen and political and institutional responses were not developed. A 
better understanding of what these transformations involve can help to identify the 
tasks that have to be accomplished even if the precise institutional and policy 
solutions will be different across countries because of different initial conditions and 
political settlements.  
 
1. The Limits of the Good Governance Agenda  
From the perspective of institutional economics the ‘good governance’ agenda 
focuses on strengthening institutional rules that could make markets more efficient by 
reducing transaction costs. The promotion of good governance can therefore be 
described as a ‘market-enhancing’ governance strategy. The specific governance 
goals in the ‘good governance’ agenda should not be confused with governance in 
general, because there are other governance capabilities that are ignored in the good 
governance approach. We will refer to some of these specific targeted capabilities as 
developmental, transformational or growth-enhancing governance capabilities. Much 
confusion has been created by cross-country econometric exercises that have found 
that richer or better performing countries score higher in terms of their ‘good 
governance’ scores. The problem is that the most sophisticated econometric 
techniques are inadequate for conclusively proving causality: did the prior 
improvement of good governance scores have an effect on growth and development? 
The historical evidence suggests that no country achieved significant ‘good 
governance’ capabilities before they developed their economy (some of this evidence 




This is not surprising because good governance capabilities are actually capabilities 
for delivering expensive public goods (like a rule of law) and it is difficult if not 
impossible to make significant progress in poor economies with limited fiscal 
resources. Moreover, no amount of enforcement capability is going to result in 
effective enforcement unless powerful organizations in society find that the 
enforcement of the rules in question is ultimately in their own interest. This alignment 
of interests assumes that most organizations in that society are already productive 
enough to be able to benefit from the enforcement of market rules. The fact that 
advanced economies appear to approximate ‘good governance’ is therefore not 
surprising but this does not necessarily tell us how they got there. The critical policy 
question is whether significant improvements in good governance are a necessary 
precondition for development. This is not to deny that small differences in market-
enhancing governance are possible and that at the margin these can make some 
difference, but can these differences possibly explain the huge differences in 
developmental success across countries? 
 
The problem of looking at cross-country data on governance and economic 
performance in an ahistorical way is that by looking at the end-state, we can easily 
miss the processes through which market-enhancing governance developed over time. 
How did successful countries improve their ‘good governance’ characteristics? Did 
they succeed in somehow enforcing market-enhancing property rights and ‘good 
governance’ and then develop rapidly as a result? Or did they have other governance 
capabilities that allowed them to grow, with their ‘good governance’ capabilities 
developing as growth generated the productive organizations who would support the 
enforcement of formal market rules and who had the resources to pay for the delivery 
and enforcement of these rules? Economic history can interpreted using econometrics 
to suggest the first possibility (for instance Acemoglu, et al. 2001, 2002) but I believe 
that a reading of history that focuses on the evidence of processes suggests that the 
latter is closer to the truth (Khan 2012a).  
 
Successful countries had other ‘growth-promoting’ governance capabilities that 
allowed them to sustain growth but these were very different from ‘good governance’ 
capabilities. As they grew, good governance capabilities did get stronger and did 
assist their economic performance. As a result, if we look at the cross-country data we 
can find evidence that good governance is associated both with higher incomes and to 
a weaker extent with growth. But these correlations do not tell us how successful 
countries actually sustained growth for the long periods when good governance was 
largely missing. Yet for developing economies in Africa and elsewhere, these 
processes of transformation and the governance capabilities required for sustaining 
and accelerating the emergence of modern economies and societies are the most 
important questions for policy.  
 
Rather than having stable property rights, a good rule of law, low corruption and other 
attributes of good governance from the outset, successful countries typically had a 
more targeted set capabilities that sustained their transformations. These governance 
capabilities helped the implementation of strategies to accelerate accumulation and 
technology acquisition, improve resource allocation and achieve political stabilization 
in difficult contexts using pragmatic strategies that differed from country to country. 
Some developers were dramatically successful, others less so. However, for very good 
reasons, the governance capabilities and political arrangements in successful countries 
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display considerable variation across countries, implying that there is no single 
blueprint for successful transformational governance. To make matters worse, policies 
and institutional arrangements that worked well in one context can be associated with 
weaker or negative results in other contexts. For instance, institutions that protected 
domestic industries and subsidized exports had very positive effects on technology 
adoption in countries like South Korea where the political settlement allowed firms 
receiving support in these ways to be effectively disciplined. In Pakistan in the 1960s 
similar policies for supporting infant industries had less dramatic effects. Here firms 
could protect themselves from subsidy withdrawal and therefore had much lower 
compulsions to raise productivity. Indeed in some countries or for some sectors, some 
strategies of protection and subsidies may actually have had negative effects.  
 
The large variance in the outcomes associated with targeted interventions is of course 
a major reason why orthodox policy advisors have tried to reduce the policy space for 
the developing country state and focused on reform on how to make markets more 
efficient, including good governance reforms. Implicitly, these policies aim to protect 
developing countries from the possibility of making mistakes by reducing their 
discretion. The attempt to protect developing countries from the dangers of policy 
autonomy is not only somewhat patronizing but is actually deeply damaging as well 
(Fukuyama 2005). Even if some states have made costly mistakes in the past and even 
if there were ‘right policies’ known to more intelligent policy-makers from other 
countries, societies cannot be put on sustainable growth paths by introducing the 
‘right’ policies and limiting the autonomy of their states to make variations thereafter.  
 
Growth requires a continuous adaptation to changing economic and political 
circumstances and this most vital capability can be destroyed or stunted by strategies 
that aim to constrain the policy autonomy of policy-makers. Even the most 
ideological supporters of market economics will concede that within broad limits 
sustaining growth requires a significant amount of policy autonomy to respond to 
crisis and challenge in creative ways. Indeed, crisis and challenge can be created by 
the operation of markets themselves, a fact that we are temporarily reminded of 
during deep global crises and then tend to forget very rapidly. More seriously, the 
historical reality is that the ability to act autonomously may be even more important at 
earlier stages of development because there is actually a much wider range of 
variation in successful strategies of social transformation than would be conceded by 
market-fundamentalist economists (Khan 2012a, 2012b).  
 
Growth and development requires nothing less than the transformation of pre-
capitalist, largely agrarian societies into modern productive ones. These processes 
involve interlinked strategies of accumulation, technology acquisition, and the 
management of conflicts unleashed by social transformation. As societies have 
different political, social and economic initial conditions, it is not surprising that they 
do not follow the same strategies and paths of transformation. Nevertheless, there 
have been more and less successful policies and strategies, and we can learn from the 
ways in which countries addressed problems during their transformations even though 
the precise instruments and methods cannot be copied and replicated (Amsden 2001). 
The real irony is that by airbrushing out this admittedly messy history, the sequence 
of reforms identified in the good governance strategy has identified a series of steps 
that were never actually followed as reform priorities by any successful country 
making the transition from poverty to development. By setting apparently plausible 
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but unachievable good governance capabilities as the policy target, the global policy 
discourse has set developing countries a goal they cannot possibly achieve and that is 
unlikely to help them to traverse the developmental transformation any better. 
 
Ultimately, societies have to devise their own political compromises and governance 
institutions that can pragmatically address their growth challenges as best as possible 
given their political constraints. However, the diversity of development paths does not 
of course imply that any strategy is as good as any other. There are many flawed 
strategies that self-seeking developing country elites have pursued and justified as 
developmental strategies to the detriment of development. Even if blueprints are not 
available, the growth-enhancing governance analysis can provide alternative 
objectives to developing countries against which they can assess the outcomes of their 
current policies and institutions. The critical observation is only that poor countries 
should not be attempting to implement a blueprint for any particular type of 
governance but instead identify areas of governance that are most likely to make a 
difference given the growth challenges they face. This implies that policy-makers, 
political leaderships and broader social constituencies should be aware of and engage 
with their own experiences and those of other countries. What were the critical 
problems of accumulation, resource allocation and technology adoption faced by 
rapid developers? How did they address them? Were there differences in their policies 
and institutions? What would be the best way of addressing these problems in our 
country? If the instruments and policies followed by another developer are unlikely to 
be effectively implementable, are there alternative strategies that that could address 
these problems in our political context? 
 
2. Transformation Challenges for Governance  
The historical evidence in Asia and elsewhere suggests that developmental 
transformations have required strong state capabilities for dealing with critical market 
failures (Amsden 1989; Wade 1990; Khan and Jomo 2000; Lall 2003). However, even 
when the role of the state in the ‘statist’ transitions in East Asian countries is widely 
recognized, liberal economists argue that these experiences cannot be replicated in 
other countries because their politics and governance capabilities are different. If 
replication means the reproduction of any particular country’s governance strategy in 
its entirety, we would agree. Instead, the growth-enhancing (or transformational) 
governance approach identifies structural problems that historical transitions 
addressed so that contemporary developing societies can address the problems of 
social transformation with institutions and policies that are likely to at least partially 
address these problems given their own institutional and political initial conditions, 
and perhaps with greater social justice and with fewer costly mistakes.  
 
In understanding the challenges facing Africa, we need to keep in mind the structural 
features of developing countries that require the development of growth-enhancing 
governance capabilities (Khan 2005). Two areas in particular stand out as requiring 
attention. First, developing countries require governance capabilities to manage the 
allocation of rights over valuable resources given that property rights will remain 
weakly defined during early stages of development. Historical evidence and economic 
theory both suggest that contrary to good governance theory, the weakness of 
property rights in developing countries is structural and not entirely due to the greed 
of political leaderships or their inadequate political will to enforce a rule of law. In 
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these contexts, state capabilities for improving resource allocations through non-
market processes have played a vital role for better or for worse.  
 
An important developmental difference between countries has therefore been the 
effectiveness of their states in managing non-market institutional solutions to resource 
allocation problems in contexts of weakly defined rights. The incentives of political 
elites to pursue strategies that were socially beneficial and not just privately profitable 
were vitally important. Countries have differed significantly in the degree of injustice 
and violence during these transitions and in the developmental outcomes they 
achieved. The challenge is to incrementally improve capabilities for asset and 
resource allocation using non-market institutional processes. This may also require a 
restructuring of political organizations to align the incentives of political elites if the 
political settlement is adverse for development to begin with (Khan 2010). Clearly, 
this type of ‘governance reform’ is explicitly political and the experience of other 
countries can at best serve as a catalyst for political movements within a country to try 
and restructure domestic politics in more developmental ways. The governance 
improvements here are bound to be country-specific because what is feasible depends 
very closely on the initial structure of political organizations in that political 
settlement and the types of political entrepreneurs and movements that emerge. 
 
Second, development in poor countries is also constrained by a variety of market 
failures that prevent investment in sectors that require the absorption, adaptation and 
learning of advanced technologies. Entrepreneurs and their organizations in late 
developers have to rapidly acquire the tacit knowledge required for using modern 
technologies at levels of productivity that makes them competitive. The acquisition of 
these capabilities through investment in learning-by-doing processes faces significant 
contracting failures that can prevent private investors from organizing the financing 
for the learning-by-doing. The effectiveness with which technology adoption can be 
assisted by public policies has therefore been an important dimension of 
developmental difference across countries. In turn, this has required complementary 
governance capabilities on the part of the state to provide incentives for learning-by-
doing while creating compulsions for entrepreneurs not to waste resources. The 
experience of East Asia shows that while the institutions and policies for assisting 
learning differed widely, in the successful cases, policies were compatible with 
political conditions in ways that allowed the creation of credible incentives and 
compulsions for learning (Khan 2000; Khan and Blankenburg 2009). The 
compatibility or otherwise of policies with the political settlement can also help to 
explain why very similar strategies failed to deliver good results in other countries.  
 
Clearly, compared to the high growth Asian countries, the initial conditions for 
implementing developmental strategies are relatively adverse in many African 
countries both in terms of initial entrepreneurial capabilities and the suitability of their 
political settlements for enforcing developmental policies. Nevertheless, the historical 
evidence of the types of challenges that need to be addressed during developmental 
transformations can be useful for identifying feasible incremental strategies of 
building growth-enhancing governance capabilities in their specific political 
settlements. A ‘good governance’ strategy of protecting and enforcing all existing 
property rights and a rule of law is unlikely to make much progress in the typical 
developing country. But a strategy to identify the most important property right 
transformations that are required for the development of the most likely sectors, 
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supported by strategies for assisting learning-by-doing and the development of 
competitiveness in those sectors can pay dividends. The sectors would have to be 
carefully chosen, and the strategies would have to be compatible with existing 
technocratic and political enforcement capabilities. In many cases, this would mean 
that the initial experiments may have to be on a relatively small scale and scaled up 
when successful. Undoubtedly, any country will make mistakes on the way, as all 
previous countries have done. Perhaps the most important correction required to our 
current way of thinking is to understand that the adoption and learning of 
technological, bureaucratic and governance capabilities is an incremental process that 
involves making mistakes and learning from them. 
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